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Abstract – Nowadays, storing the information is fundamental for the correct
functioning of any organization. The critical factor is to guarantee the security of
the stored data. In the traditional database systems the security requirements are
limited to confidentiality, integrity, availability of the data and user authorization.
The criticality of the database system and data repositories for modern business
with the new requirements of law and governments, makes the development of
new system architecture necessary which ensures sophisticated set of security
services. In this paper we propose the database architecture that ensures the
non-repudiation of the user queries and data warehouse actions. These security
services are accomplished by means of the middleware layer in the data warehouse
architecture.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, in the digital service era, increasing adoption of database systems and
storing data have became a crucial issue for the public and private institutions. The
huge amount of data is stored in the data repositories which have to manage a number
of issues [1–6]. As the examples of these issues we can enumerate: management of
data flow between the parts of the system (the client and the server of repository),
∗bogdan.ksiezopolski@umcs.lublin.pl
Pobrane z czasopisma Annales AI- Informatica http://ai.annales.umcs.pl
Data: 04/08/2020 20:56:46
UM
CS
132 Middleware non-repudiation service for the data warehouse
balancing loading and management of assets, security of information, increasing system
reliability and guaranteeing quality parameters. Among the enumerated problems
one can emphasise information security issues. This aspect is especially important
because in many cases protecting information which is stored in databases is crucial
for companies.
The security of the data repository must meet three main security requirements [7]:
confidentiality, integrity and availability. Confidentiality is related to the protection
of data against unauthorized disclosure, integrity is related to the prevention against
improper information modification and availability is related to the timely and reliable
access to the database with prevention and recovery from hardware and software errors.
Nowadays, these three main security requirements are guaranteed in all application
environments. These security requirements can be accomplished by means of two layers,
the middleware system layer and the database management system layer (DBMS).
In the DBMS the data confidentiality is ensured by means of the access control
mechanism [7, 8]. This mechanism checks the rights of the user before granting the
access to the objects in the database. After positive user authorization the data is
transmited to the higher layer where the data is encrypted. Finally, the encrypted
data is transmited to the user. Data integrity is guaranteed by means of the access
control table mechanism and semantic integrity constraints. When the user wants to
modify the data the access control mechanisms verify the user rights and after the
positive verification grant the access to the data. The semantic correctness is verified
by the set of the defined conditions. Data availability is ensured by means of the
recovery subsystem and the concurrency control mechanism which corrects hardware
and software failures.
Nowadays, data security requirements have evolved and the traditional ones are
insufficient. The organizations store the data which are crucial for everyday operations
and the access to them is needed in the real time. Furthermore, the organizations
require more than storing the data [3–5, 7, 9], they need the adoption of solutions which
ensure new requirements such as data quality and completeness, access control and
privacy for mobile user, database survivability. These requirements can be guaranteed
by means of various sets of security requirements [10–12]. While designing the database
systems, we can take care of different extra security services [13] and fulfilling them is
the challenge for today’s systems [7]. Among them, we can enumerate non-repudiation
[14]. The characteristics of this service are presented in Table 1.
In the article we would like to present the new data warehouse architecture which
will guarantee the non-repudiation of user queries and actions performed by the data
warehouse. The non-repudiation cannot be ensured by means of DBMS but it is
possible to guarantee it by means of the middleware system layer. In this layer the
security operations are proceeded before the data is transferred to the database and
DBMS layer. The non-repudiation will be guaranteed between the users who make the
operation in the data repository and the data warehouse. The important feature in the
proposed architecture is that the non-repudiation service can be guaranteed not only
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Table 1. Characteristics of non-repudiation.
Name of service Characteristics
Non-repudiation of user queries Non-repudiation of the fact of sending
the query to the data warehouse by the
user.
Non-repudiation of data warehouse
actions
Non-repudiation of the fact of the users’
queries accomplishment by the data
warehouse
for all transmitted data but the particular records in the tables can be selected. For
fulfilling this feature we would like to introduce the new data structure called Extra
Security Label. Owing to this structure, the management of the non-repudiation service
can be obtained. In the article we would like to present the schemes of data flow in
the data warehouse which will ensure the non-repudiation security service.
2 Basic model of the data repository
The systems where the huge amount of data is stored, are organized into database
repositories. Data repositories can be based on different architectures [1, 2]. The
attempt at its standardizing takes the ’Storage System Standards Working Group’,
which works out the standards of storing data for local and distributed data warehouse
[15].
Fig. 1. The architecture of the data repository.
The model of data repository architecture based on the standard described by
’SSSWG’ [15] and its simplest form described in the article is presented in Fig. 1.
The architecture includes the client site and the server site [16]. The client site
can be limited just to the client application without any additional functionality and
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then it is called a thin client. Another possibility is a rich client application which
shifts resources and server machines onto the clients computers. Server sites consist of
front-end software and back-end databases with the interface software linking the two
(application program interfaces - API). In the front-end software one can enumerate:
client application layer, server application layer, middleware layer, teleinformatic
infrastructure layer and the security management system. The back-end databases
consist of database management system and database layer. Below we present the
description of the parts of the data repository architecture in detail.
Client application layer
Client application layer is responsible for an access to the data repository. By means
of this layer clients can control all operations on data warehouse. The functions
which are realized by that layer depend on the client type (thin or rich) [16]. If the
architecture is based on the thin client, then that layer is limited just to the standard
communication protocols and it can be ftp over ssh (sftp) or http over ssh (https)
[12, 17–19]. Thanks to the usage of widespread communication canals we took care
about common usage of data warehouse. Another possibility extends the functionality
of the client site and then it is called the rich client. Then, advanced security functions
are controlled by means of additional client applications [17, 19].
Server application layer
Client communication applications connect with the appropriate data repository
servers. Those servers are the interfaces between the users and the back-end database
layer. The security of that layer is very important because the vulnerabilities in
the servers can lead to the attack on the middleware and the database layer. The
complexity of the server layer depends on the number of possible communication
canals which are accessible in the particular repository architecture.
Middleware layer
The issues of data repository management are accomplished in the middleware layer.
The correct functioning of data warehouse mostly depends on that layer. As an
example of tasks executed in the middleware layer we can enumerate: managing of
the storing data for individual clients (privilege management, bandwitch management,
management of access to the database), management of the access to the hardware
which stores the data (defining for individual user the storing data hardware with
optimal access time and capability, management of backup of databases). The
management of the user and data security may be realized by that layer. In the
situation when the security is the crucial aspect, the security operations should be
realized by the individual layer for example, in the security management layer (Fig. 1).
Database and database management system layer
A DBMS is a complex set of software programs that controls the organization, storage,
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management, and retrieval of data in a database. The DBMS accepts requests for
data from higher layers and instructs the operating system to transfer the appropriate
data. The DBMS includes: modelling language, data structure, database query
language, transaction mechanism [16].
Security management system layer
The security management system layer can be present depending on the infrastructure.
That layer controls the actions in the repository (meaning security which fulfils the
security requirements for a given case). That layer cooperates with other layers and
communicates with them by means of application program interfaces (APIs). The
security management system is connected with local security databases which are
used for storing crucial security information (keys, certificates, users, sessions).
2.1 Managing the security services - ESL
For managing the extra security services we would like to introduce a new structure
to the data repository. The proposed structure is similar to the one in the Oracle
database management system - version 9 [13, 20, 21] and based on the defining labels
which are assigned to the rows and the users of the database. In these labels the
management information about the extra security requirements will be stored. We will
called it "Extra Security Label (ESL)". The system includes two types of Extra Security
Label (ESL). The first one is General Extra Security Label (GESL) and contains the
management information which refers to all rows in the table. The second one is the
Record Extra Security Label (RESL) and contains the information which controls the
extra security requirements for the individual rows in the table. The ESL consists of
the components which are connected with every possible extra security service which
can be ensured. In the article we limit the security service to non-repudiation. The
structure of the table with Extra Security Labels which contains more than one security
service is shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. The Extra Security Labels (ESLs).
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The Extra Security Label consists of the following components:
• Control: these fields include the names of the security services required by
the table or the record.
• Security service: these fields include the information needed for realization
of a particular security service in the database system. The number of these
components depends on the type of security services realized in the system.
2.2 The data flow and operations performed in the data repository
In this section we would like to present general data flow in the data repositories.
This analysis is independent of the security services guaranteed by the repositories.
The data flow in the repository can be divided into two groups of operations. These
groups and steps are presented below:
Group 1 Access control to the data repository
Group 2 Realization of the user queries
Step 1 Access control to the specific data
Step 2 Management of the data
Step 3 Presenting the results of the queries
The first group of operations is the access control verification to the whole system of
data warehouse. The positive authorization allows the user to take action in the data
repository system.
The second group deals with making the queries to the specific data by the positively
authorized user. This group can be divided into three steps. The first step is the access
control to the specific data in the database. This access control mechanism refers to
the authorization of the specific database and grants the privileges to the databases
and to the specific tables. The second step is responsible for the management of the
transfer data. The possible actions include not only operation on the databases but
also the management issues (exp. settlement of the usage of data repository, payment
options). In this step, the main operations of fulfilling the extra security services are
realized. In the third step the results of previous operation are presented to the user.
It could be an error following the negative authorization or the data as a response to
the user query.
In the article we omit presentation of the data flow of all operations made by the
data warehouse because of the page limit of the article. In the next sections we would
like to focus on the data flow which guarantees non-repudiation service.
3 Extra security service: Non-repudiation
In Table 1 two types of non-repudiation are described. Data warehouse client can use
a particular type of non-repudiation depending on the requirements of the specific tables
into the database. In the scenarios described below we assume that the records in the
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tables are configured. The record configuration is related to defining the Extra Security
Labels. Another assumption in the scenarios concerns the public and secret keys of
the user and the data warehouse. We assume that the data warehouse clients and the
data warehouse have a secret key and the appropriate valid certificate authorized by
one of the Certificate Authority. In the next sections we present the data flow of the
non-repudiation of the user and the data repository actions.
3.1 Notation of parameters
In this section we would like to describe the notation of the parameters used in the
article:
IDoperation - the id of the data warehouse operation;
queryusern - the query of the n user;
T (queryusern) - the timestamp of the query of the n user;
IDquery - the random number identifing the concrete query;
SKusern - the secret key of the n user;
PKusern - the public key of the n user;
SKdw - the secret key of the data warehouse;
IDusern - the information about the n user;
T (PKusern) - the timestamp of the public key of the n user;
SKCA - the secret key of the certificate authority;
IDtableservicen - the index to the table where the managment data of the conrete
service for the n user is stored;
IDrecordn - the id of the n record on which the data warehouse made the actions;
Rquery - the remarks to the query;
T (IDquery) - the timestamp made after realization of the query;
IDoperationn - the id of the n operations made by the data warehouse;
T (queryusern , IDquery, dw) - the timestamp of received user n query by the data
warehouse (dw).
3.2 Non-repudiation of user queries
The non-repudiation of user queries means that every query made by a user is
cryptographically registered by the repository. As the result of this non-repudiation
service the user query to the data warehouse cannot be denied. Every time the data
warehouse can verify the queries made by the user. In the architecture presented below
this security service is fulfilled by means of the digitally signed information connected
to specific user queries. The scheme of the non-repudiation of user queries is shown in
Fig. 3. Below we describe that process.
(1) A user makes a query to the database and to the specific table in the
database. This data includes: id of the made operation (IDoperation), the
query (queryusern), the timestamp of the query (T (queryusern)), the random
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Fig. 3. The scenario of realization of the non-repudiation for user queries.
number which identifies a particular query (IDquery) and the certificate of
the n user ((PKusern , IDusern , T (PKusern))SKCA). This data is digitally
signed by the secret key of the n user which receives the data:
(IDoperation, queryusern , T (queryusern , IDquery)SKusern ,
(PKusern , IDusern , T (PKusern))SKCA .
The query is sent by the client application layer directly to the server layer.
After the access control mechanism the security of the transmitted data is
defined [17].
(2) The server application layer receives the client data and transports it to the
middleware application layer.
(3) The middleware application layer adds the time stamp of the received query
(T (queryusern , IDquery, dw)) and transports the user query to the database
management system layer (DBMS).
(4) The DBMS layer receives the query and grants the appropriate privileges
to the table for the user. After the positive verification the DBMS reads the
GESL of the table and checks the control label where required security services
are written. After that the DBMS reads in the GESL the metadata connected
with the required service. This field includes the index (IDtableservicen ) to the
data in the Local Security Database where detailed management data for the
user n and the security service (service) are stored. In the next step the
DBMS checks the RESL for every record refering to the user query. The
control field in the RESL of the particular record includes the confirmation of
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the required security services. Owing to the individual confirmations of the
data one can select specific records for which extra security services will be
required. In the last phase of this step the DBMS makes the user query to
the appriopraite records in the database.
(5) The DBMS transports the data to the Middleware layer and the id of the
records (IDrecordn) for which the non-repudiation of the receiver is required.
(6) The Middleware layer verifies the n user signature (SKusern) according to
the data warehouse security policy (user certificate validation according to
the time stamp added in step 3 - T (queryusern , IDquery, dw)). It can be
done by means of the OCSP protocol [22] or XAdES standard [23]. After
the positive verification the Middleware layer creates the data which will be
used during the verification of the non-repudiation of the n user queries.
This data includes the information sent by the n user in the first step
((IDoperation, queryusern , T (queryusern , IDquery))SKusern ,
(PKusern , IDusern , T (PKusern))SKCA), the id of the records for which
the non-repudiation service will be fulfilled (IDrecordn) and the index
(IDtableservicen ) to the data in the Local Security Database where detailed
management information of these security services is stored. The whole
verification data include:
(IDoperation, queryusern , T (queryusern , IDquery))SKusern ,
(PKusern , IDusern , T (PKusern))SKCA ,
IDrecordn , IDtableservicen , T (queryusern , IDquery, dw).
(7) The Middleware layer transmits the verification data to the Security
Management System Layer (SMS).
(8) The SMS stores the verification data to the Local Security Database in the
table which is indexed by the number gathered in step 4.
(9-10) The requested data in the n user query is transported to the n user.
3.3 Non-repudiation of data warehouse actions
The non-repudiation of data warehouse operations means that every action made
by a client on the data warehouse is cryptographically registered by this client. The
data warehouse cannot deny that some actions were performed by the repository. The
user has cryptographically secure confirmation that stores, receives or modifies the
data. This feature is obtained by the usage of the digital signature made by the data
warehouse. The scheme of the presented type of non-repudiation is similar to that of
non-repudation of user queries shown in Fig. 3. Below we describe this process.
(1-5) These steps are the same as in the non-repudiation of user queries.
(6) The Middleware layer creates the data which will be used during
verification of the non-repudiation of the data warehouse actions. This data
includes the part of the information sent by the n user in the first step
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((IDoperation, queryusern , T (queryusern , IDquery))SKusern ), the id of the
records for which the non-repudiation service will be fulfilled (IDrecordn),
the timestamp of the realized query (T (IDquery), the id’s of the n realized
operations by the data warehouse (IDoperationn), the timestamp of the
received user n query T (queryusern , IDquery, dw) and optionally the remarks
to the user query Rquery. This information is digitally signed by the secret
key of the data warehouse (SKdw). The whole verification data include:
(IDoperation, queryusern , T (queryusern , IDquery))SKusern ,
(IDrecordn , T (IDquery), IDoperationn , Rquery,
T (queryusern , IDquery, dw))SKdw .
(7-8) Steps 7 and 8 will be omitted in this scenario.
(9-10) The requested data in the n user query and the verification data prepared in
step 6 are transported to the n user.
4 Security considerations
In the article the authors present the architecture which guarantees the
non-repudiation security service in the storing systems. In this section we focus on
the steps in which the crucial security data are created. These data are related to
the information which is used during the non-repudiation verification process. The
character of these data deals with the type of non-repudiation security service and the
analysis is presented below.
4.1 Non-repudiation of user queries
The system data flow is presented in Fig. 3 and the crucial information is created in
step 6. These data include:
(IDoperation, queryusern , T (queryusern , IDquery))SKusern ,
(PKusern , IDusern , T ((PKusern))SKCA ,
IDrecordn , IDtableservicen , T (queryusern , IDquery, dw).
Owing to the user certificate ((PKusern , IDusern , T (PKusern))SKCA) the data
repository can identify the particular user. The data warehouse stores the detailed
information about the user query which is digitally signed by the n user’s secret
key (SKusern). These data include the specific user query (queryusern), the id of
the operation on the database ((IDoperation), the time when the query was sent
(T (queryusern), the timestamp when the query was received by the middleware
layer (T (queryusern , IDquery, dw)) and the unique identification of the user query
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(IDquery). This information can be used in case of the verification of non-repudiation
of the user query.
Additionally, the data repository stores the id of the records (IDrecordn) on which the
particular non-repudiation type was realized. Thanks to the individual selections of
the table records different types of extra security service can be implemented. As an
example one can show the non-repudiation of the user queries and the anonymity of
the user. If the only possibility for realization of non-repudiation service was choosing
the whole table in the database then it wouldn’t be possible to realize the anonymity
for a specific record in this table.
In step 3 the middleware layer adds the timestamp of the concrete query sent by
the user T (queryusern , IDquery, dw). The timestamp is used in step 6 when the
middleware layer validates the n user certificate. This process is based on checking the
validity time of the n user certificate and the timestamp of the n user query. These
actions are very important because the non-repudiation service can be guaranteed
only for the user who has a valid certificate.
The last type of information which is stored by the data warehouse is the index to the
table in the Local Security Database (IDtableservicen ) where the verification data for
the n user and service are stored.
4.2 Non-repudiation of data warehouse actions
The system data flow is presented in Fig. 3 and the crucial information is created
in step 6. These data include:
(IDoperation, queryusern , T (queryusern , IDquery))SKusern ,
(IDrecordn , T (IDquery), IDoperationn , Rquery,
T (queryusern , IDquery, dw))SKdw .
The first part of information is the n user request for the data ((IDoperation,
queryusern , T (queryusern , IDquery))SKusern ). This information combines the user
query with the verification data from the data warehouse.
The crucial operation which guarantees for the n user the non-repudiation of the data
warehouse actions is the data warehouse digital signature (SKdw) of the n user query
information and the response information from the data repository. The response
information from the data warehouse includes:
(IDrecordn , T (IDquery), IDoperationn , Rquery,
T (queryusern , IDquery, dw).
Thanks to the id of the records (IDrecordn) data warehouse informs the user about
the records on which the non-repudiation service was realized. Another thing is the
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timestamp (T (IDquery)) which is generated after realization of the user query, thanks
to which the user can read the time when the query was realized. The data repository
sends the set of operations made on the records. This information is represented
by the (IDoperationn). Another information is the timestamp of the received query
T (queryusern , IDquery, dw) which can be used as an argument in case of rejecting the
user query because of not valid user certificate. Optionally, the data warehouse can
have some remarks about the actions which are realized and it can be sent to the user
(Rquery).
5 Conclusions
Modern business requires a new system architecture which ensures a sophisticated set
of security services. Besides the traditional ones which guarantee the confidentiality of
the data, integrity of the data and authorization of the user one can enumerate extra
security services. In this paper, we have presented the architecture of the database
system which ensures the non-repudiation security service. In the article we have
introduced the new structure of data which manages the usage of the extra security
service in the system and is called Extra Security Label (ESL). This label is ready
for realization in more than one security service and is designed for any extra security
service. Thanks to the presented architecture one can ensure the non-repudiation
security service in the data repositories. Fulfilling of this security service is crucial in
many modern e-commerce and e-government applications [3, 6, 24, 25].
In the future we would like to design the architecture of extra security services [7] e.g.:
anonymity, intellectual property rights (IPR), access control and privacy for mobile
user, database survivability. Another important issue which has to be solved in the
future work is how to combine all extra security services in one data warehouse. One of
the future problems can be connected with the services which except another one, for
example the non-repudiation of the sender and the anonymity of the sender. Another
thing is the quality of the systems which ensure extra security services. Currently, we
are implementing the data repositories where we ensure the non-repudiation security
service. After accomplishing this task we would like to check the quality of the data
repository where the new architecture will be used.
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